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Pakistan’s twin interrelated challenges: economic
development and security
CLAUDE GEORGES PIERRE RAKISITS1*
The 2010 devastating floods in Pakistan have starkly reminded the world of
the two critical, interrelated challenges confronting Pakistan: economic
development and security. And whilst the Pakistan government’s capacity to
deal with these two issues before the flood was already shaky at best, its
position now is even more precarious given the enormity of the task of
rebuilding the infrastructure that has been destroyed in this latest natural
disaster. Nuclear-armed Pakistan is a large and strategically important
country, critically located on one of the world’s most important geopolitical
crossroads. It is a pivotal player in a region*covering the Middle East,
Central Asia and South Asia*which has much potential, but which also has
unresolved conflicts and various degrees of instability. Accordingly, because
Pakistan is so important to the stability of the region and the world at large,
it is vital that it be able to address successfully these twin challenges.
Keywords: Pakistan; security; Taliban
Introduction
The devastating floods which struck Pakistan in the middle of 2010 were a stark
reminder for the international community of how fragile this country really is
with regard to the interrelated challenges of economic development and
security. I will argue in this article that unless these two challenges are dealt
with comprehensively, the country’s economic and political future could well be
very bleak. I have divided this article into three parts. The first section*‘the
economic development challenge’*examines the country’s main socio-econom-
ic indicators and its inability to meet some of the United Nations’ most
important Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. I also briefly
focus on the dire socio-economic situation in the Federally Administered Tribal
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Areas (FATA) of Pakistan because of the critical importance region plays in the
security challenges of Pakistan. The second section*‘the security challenge’*
analyses the political situation in the FATA and how its lack of political
integration with the rest of the country has facilitated the embedment of Al
Qaeda and Afghan Taliban fighters in those tribal areas since 2001. I also
discuss how the presence of these foreign jihadist forces has facilitated the
growth of Pakistan’s own militant groups and, accordingly, has led to the
progressive Talibanisation of the FATA and other parts of the country. I also
examine the Pakistan government’s different responses to the militancy
problem*signing peace accords, entering into ‘agreements’ or conducting
military operations. The third and concluding section discusses what these
challenges mean for the country; what the government of Pakistan needs to do;
and, importantly, what the international community, especially the United
States, is doing to assist Pakistan to deal with these two interrelated challenges.
The economic development challenge
Pakistan is going through some very difficult economic times. A few figures will
illustrate the point. In 20092010, Pakistan posted a massive trade imbalance
(US$15.6 billion), a very large budget deficit equivalent to over 6.2 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP), high unemployment (15.2 percent), a high
inflation rate (11.3 percent) and an external debt of US$74 billion. As a result of
the country’s dire economic situation, the International Monetary Fund had
agreed to lend Pakistan US$11.3 billion over two years in late 2008 in order to
avoid what most feared was an imminent economic collapse (see The
Economist 2010; EIU 2010). However, even with this financial rescue package
and, importantly, before the 2010 devastating floods, Islamabad estimated that
Pakistan required an additional US$1015 billion to stabilise the depreciating
rupee, restore investor confidence and jump-start the economy.
It is important to remember that approximately 24 percent of the country
lives below the poverty line (down from 32.6 percent in 1999) and the gross
national income per capita in purchasing power parity is US$2600, which is
only slightly lower than in neighbouring India, where it is about US$3000 per
person.2 These are very bad figures, but, unfortunately, they will have
undoubtedly worsened following the floods, which affected 20 percent of the
country. President Asif Ali Zardari confirmed this fear when he stated that
these floods will have set back Pakistan’s economic development by at least
three years and that Pakistan may never completely recover from this disaster.
Given that 70 percent of the population lives in rural areas and Pakistan
depends on agriculture for about 2030 percent of its income, these floods are,
indeed, a disaster.3 It has been estimated that over 5000 kilometres of roads
and 7000 schools have been damaged. Some 20 million people have been
affected, and millions will require food assistance for months to come.
140 Claude Georges Pierre Rakisits
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 2
2:3
6 2
5 M
arc
h 2
01
2 
According to Prime Minister Yusuf Gilani, the cost of the reconstruction could
amount to US$43 billion.4
However, even before the devastating floods, the land was already
exacerbated by other environmental stresses. For example, in a recent report
by the US Congressional Research Service, the authors discuss how the lack of
water, due to an increase in demand and drought, has affected agricultural
production and reduced the area of arable land. This is a disaster for a country
with such a high population growth rate. Compounding even more the drought
problem is that Pakistan has one of the highest deforestation rates in the world:
only 4 percent of the country’s original forested area is intact. Needless to say,
deforestation leads to soil erosion and weakens the ecosystem (Vaughn et al.
2010: 7). It is almost certain that this would have made Pakistan that much
more vulnerable to the 2010 floods.
Over the long term, the environmental stress has inevitably had a negative impact
on the socio-economic development of the country (Vaughn et al. 2010: 15). While
over the last few years Pakistan’s human development indicators have generally
improved, they largely lag behind other countries in the region. Key challenges
facing Pakistan include a poorly targeted social safety net, an infrastructure deficit*
particularly in energy, transport and irrigation*and poor delivery of social services.
Since 1990, the World Bank has been publishing the Human Development
Index, which looks at a broader definition of well-being rather than the
traditional GDP per capita. It provides a broadened prism for viewing human
progress and the complex relationship between income and well-being.
According to the Human Development Index, Pakistan in 2007 was ranked
141 out of 182 countries, behind India, which was ranked 134, but ahead of
Bangladesh, which was ranked 146 (see UNDP 2009).
It is a well-know fact that if a country is serious about tackling poverty, it must
reduce its population growth. As it stands today, Pakistan, which has a population
of about 170 million, has an average annual population growth of 2.3 percent
(compared to India’s 1.4 percent). If this rate continues, Pakistan, which is now
the sixth most populous nation in the world, will have doubled its population to
340 million by 2040, pushing it up to fourth place after India, China and the
United States. In purely economic terms, this is a terrible prospect for Pakistan.
It is generally agreed among experts in the development field that an important
tool for dealing with the rising population issue is improvement in the literacy rate
of the country. Unfortunately, on that score, whilst Pakistan has made some
progress, it is still lagging far behind. In 2008, the national literacy rate for adults
above the age of 15 was 54 percent. Whilst this is an improvement since 1998,
when the literacy rate was 11 percent lower, it also means that, at this rate,
Pakistan will not meet one of its MDGs*that is, achieving an 88 percent literacy
rate by 2015, the target date set by the international community.
Turning to the other MDGs, already before the floods Pakistan was going to
have great difficulty meeting the targets of other MDGs. Examining three of
these will confirm these reservations:
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. Target 1. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people below the
poverty line. In 1990, the proportion of people below the poverty line was 26.1
percent. Pakistan would only be able to achieve the MDG target of 13 percent
by 2015 if the economic growth rate is in the order of 7.6 percent. As noted
above, this was not happening before the floods, and will certainly not in the
wake of the floods.
. Target 2. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer
from hunger. In 19901, the percentage of people consuming less than the
minimum level of dietary energy consumption was 25 percent. This figure rose
to 30 percent in 20001, making the target of 13 percent by 2015 outright
impossible to achieve, particularly in today’s economic circumstances.
. Target 5. Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five
mortality rate. In 19901, the figure was 140 per thousand live births. This
was reduced to 105 ten years later. Whilst this is a substantial achievement, it
is doubtful that the country will be able to achieve the target of 52 per
thousand live births by 2015.5
Of course, some areas are doing less well economically than others, and the
FATA*about half the size of Tasmania*is one of those parts of Pakistan that
is not doing well at all. I will pay particular attention to this region in this article
because of the importance the FATA has had in the security debate of the
country. Unfortunately, this north-western part of the country also suffered
enormously in the floods.
The FATA, inhabited by the Pakhtuns, is one of Pakistan’s most economically
backward areas. Per capita income is half that of the national per capita
income*some 60 percent of the population lives below the national poverty
line. Per capita public development expenditure is reportedly one-third of the
national average. Social development indicators are shockingly low. The overall
literacy rate is 17.42 percent, compared to 54 percent nationally. Male literacy
is 29 percent and female literacy a mere 7 percent. There are only 33 hospitals
for a population of 3.1 million. The FATA has a per-doctor rate of 1:6762,
compared to the national 1:1359. Most locals depend on subsistence agriculture
since there is little industrial development and few jobs. This situation is made
worse by the fact that about 15 percent of the population is between the ages of
15 and 22 (AI 2010: 10). Accordingly, as a consequence of the lack of economic
opportunities, thousands of young Pakhtuns leave the FATA every year to go to
Peshawar and Karachi, where they join relatives and friends, and most probably
live in very trying conditions.
The security challenge
This dire socio-economic situation in the FATA naturally leads me to what
I perceive to be Pakistan’s second major challenge: the progressive Talibanisation
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of Pakistan, in particular in the FATA and western parts of the country. As I will
discuss in greater detail later, this process of Talibanisation, which, on the whole,
is imposed coercively, has two tracks to it: political and social-religious. On the
political front, it involves the gradual displacement of the traditional civilian
authority, the malik, and his replacement by mullahs, who follow the more
conservative Deobandi interpretation of Islam. On the social-religious front, it
involves, inter alia, imposing the sharia law, banning girls from going to school
and women from working; forcing men to wear beards and closing down barber
shops; and stoning women found guilty of adultery. All in all, it is about the
radical reform of the existing social and political fabric of society.
The Talibanisation of the tribal areas and into the ‘settled’ areas has been
facilitated by the combination of three factors.6 These are the poor socio-
economic environment of the area, discussed above; the presence of Al Qaeda
and the Afghan Taliban fighters who fled Afghanistan in October 2001
following the Taliban’s ousting from power by US-led Western forces; and the
FATA’s lack of political and economic integration with the rest of the country.
Turning to the economic dimension, based on a survey of about 1000 urban
respondents, Shapiro and Fair (2010: 801) have argued that there is no direct
connection between poverty and support for the Taliban militancy. And whilst
the FATA is poor, but rural*and therefore their findings cannot be
automatically extrapolated to the tribal areas*it is evident from the high
number of executions of opponents and the daily repression of the local
population that there has been little support for the Pakistani Taliban militants.
Accordingly, this would tentatively validate Shapiro and Fair’s hypothesis in the
FATA, even though they explicitly acknowledged that their survey could not be
generalised to rural Pakistanis (Shapiro and Fair 2010: 95). However, this lack
of enthusiasm for the militants does not necessarily translate into support for
the government in Islamabad. Given the central government’s economic neglect
of the tribal areas since independence, and the widespread destruction and
deaths caused by the Pakistan army’s heavy-handed methods used to counter
the Taliban militants, it is not surprising that the people of the FATA have been
less than keen to support the central government. And while the militants do
not have any known economic agenda or plan to assist the poor of the FATA, it
is this combination of government economic neglect and the population’s less
than lukewarm support for the government which has made it easier for the
militants to make advances in the tribal areas.
Let us now turn to the existing political arrangement in the FATA because it
is probably that archaic legacy of the colonial period which explains many of
the political and security problems facing the inhabitants of the tribal areas
today. Following partition in 1947, the Pakistan government decided to
maintain in the FATA the former colonial administration’s political and legal
set-up, codified in a special legal framework known as the Frontier Crimes
Regulations (FCR) of 1901. The FCR combine traditional customs and norms
with discretionary police, judicial and executive authority in the political agent.
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But by retaining the FCR, the Pakistan government has chosen to effectively
treat the FATA’s population as separate from, and unequal to, other Pakistani
citizens (ICG 2006: 2).
The political agent, who is all-powerful and reports directly to the president
of Pakistan, exercises a mix of extensive executive, judicial and revenue powers,
and has the responsibility of maintaining law and order, and suppressing crime
in the tribal areas. The political agent, who grants tribal elders the status of
malik on the basis of male inheritance, can also arbitrarily withdraw, suspend
or cancel malik status if he deems the individual is not serving the interests of
the state. Importantly, particularly given the present difficulties engendered by
the presence of Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban fighters, the state relies on the
maliks to help with the administration of the FATA. On the other hand, the
political agent, using the powers bestowed to him by the FCR, can punish an
entire tribe for crimes committed on its territory by fines, arrests, property
seizures and blockades. Such quasi-dictatorial powers contradict the 1973
constitution, which guarantees fundamental rights to all citizens residing in the
entire territory of the country, which includes the tribal areas.7
In August 2011, President Zardari promulgated into law long-promised
political, judicial and administrative reforms in the FATA. These included:
allowing political parties to operate legally in the FATA; curtailing the arbitrary
powers of the political agent; amending the FCR by granting the right of appeal
and providing the right to bail in case of arrest; and women and children under
16 years of age were no longer to be arrested under the FCR’s Collective
Responsibility Clause. This long-overdue reform package was welcomed by
political parties and tribesmen (Raza 2009). However, to sell the changes to the
FCR the Pakistan government has given the Army more powers, effectively
taking away the rights given in the amended FCR. Moreover, the political agent
retains judicial and executive powers.
Given the FATA’s physical remoteness, it is easy to understand why it was
relatively easy for Al Qaeda and the Taliban to cross over the border and settle
in the FATA in October 2001. This was further facilitated by the Pakhtuns’
honour code, Pakhtuwali, which, inter alia, requires a Pakhtun to offer
hospitality, regardless of whether the guest is welcomed or not, a criminal, a
friend or an enemy (Spain 1972: 4654). Of course, applying this honour code
was, at least in the early stages, easy, given that the Afghan Taliban fighters
were Pakhtuns like their hosts. It was not always that easy, however, with the
Al Qaeda fighters, who are a mix of Arabs, Chechens, Uighurs, Uzbeks and
other non-Pakhtuns, which has sometimes led to violent confrontations
between the locals and their ‘guests’ (see Stenersen 2010). Nevertheless, an
Afghan Taliban mini-state was eventually established in different parts of the
FATA, thus facilitating Taliban fighters to train and prepare before launching
attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan (Lunn and Smith 2010: 3542).
The arrival of the Afghan Taliban had devastating long-term ramifications for
the stability of the FATA in particular, and the country in general. It did not take
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long for the ‘guests’ to begin imposing their extremist version of Islam, like they
had when they were in control of Afghanistan. Thus began the process of the
Talibanisation of Pakistan. The Afghans were assisted by Pakistani militants and
religious extremists who shared the same religious outlook as them. Working
together, these Taliban militants ruthlessly crushed any opposition to their
religious diktat, including assassinating maliks and replacing them with mullahs,
assassinating politicians, killing innocent civilians and attacking army personnel.
Needless to say, the Talibanisation of large swathes of the FATA has not only
cowed the inhabitants into submission, but it has effectively destroyed the
traditional Pakhtun tribal structure of the area. Many observers have argued that
prior to the arrival of the Taliban, the mullahs did not traditionally hold high
office in Pakhtun society (see Ghufran 2009: 110810).
These Taliban militants have attracted a motley group of individuals and
opportunists who are more than happy to jump on this bandwagon, which seems
to be growing from strength to strength in different parts of the country.
Accordingly, the membership of these different Pakistani Taliban groups incl-
udes Pakhtun tribesmen and their offspring, who have been radicalised and
indoctrinated by the rhetoric of jihad that started almost 30 years ago with the
anti-Soviet struggle and continued during the Afghan civil war (19926) and the
subsequent Taliban rule (19962001). It also includes returning Pakistani fighters
who participated in the fighting against the Soviets and later, between 1996 and
2001, the anti-Taliban Afghan groups (Behuria 2007: 531). Other members also
include madrasa-trained locals, criminal elements, thugs and unemployed youth.
Possibly the only good news for the government in Islamabad is that the
different Pakistani Taliban militant groups are significantly divided, particu-
larly, but not solely, with regard to whether the Pakistan army is a legitimate
target for their terrorist operations. Other important fault lines between the
different groups are tribal affiliations, leadership ambitions and competition for
regional domination in different parts of the FATA, including with regard to the
share of the highly lucrative transport and smuggling businesses. Abbas (2010),
Fishman (2010), Khan (2010) and Kheshgi (2010) have provided insightful
analyses of the political landscape of the tribal areas. There are quite a number
of militant groups whose membership changes and which splinter into smaller
units.8 However, because alliances between the different groups shift over time,
monitoring intergroup loyalties can be problematic. Still, the most important of
these Pakistani militant groups is Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the umbrella
organisation which was established in December 2007 to bring together the
disparate militant groups. It is led by Hakimullah Mehsud, who claims to have
some 15,000 fighters.9
Some of the militant groups have had a degree of support from the
army, including most likely from the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence.
However, the extent of this support is not only difficult to assess and would,
accordingly, be speculative, but it has probably changed over time and would
depend on the issue at hand. However, what is under no doubt is that during
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General Zia-ul-Haq’s rule (197788), when he implemented a harsh Islamisation
program, the military-run government encouraged the rise of the mullahs in the
FATA and the commensurate weakening of the traditional leaders, thus
preparing the groundwork for the eventual rise of the Pakistani Taliban militants
some 20 years later (see Nawaz 2008: 568). The growth of this militancy has also
been assisted by the growing influence of the Islamist parties*in particular,
Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and Jamaat-u-Islami (JUI)*in the decision-making process in
Islamabad. This was especially the case during the rule of General Musharraf
(19992007), whose political survival depended heavily on their support.
Accordingly, Musharraf never implemented his stated reform to close down
the more radical madrasas (religious schools) run by the JI and JUI, from which
many of the mullahs and Pakistani Taliban militants have graduated. So, while
the JI and JUI have never openly endorsed the violence perpetrated by the
militants, their lack of active opposition to their coercive methods has certainly
not assisted the central government’s and the army’s attempts to stop the growth
of this religious extremism.10 However, the good news is that President Zardari
and General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the Chief of Army Staff, appear to be
agreeing*at least publicly*that the focus of the military should shift away from
countering India to dealing with the growing domestic militancy (Dawn.com
2009b).
In addition to Afghan Taliban fighters regularly crossing over the border to
assist their brothers in arms to fight the Pakistan state, in a very worrying
development for Pakistan’s long-term political future, many of the FATA-
based groups have now joined up with other militant groups from other parts
of the country, particularly from the Punjab. This confirms that the militancy
problem is not solely a Pakhtun-driven threat, but a nationwide phenomenon.
The most important of these Punjabi groups are Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan,
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkatul Jihadul
Islami. These groups, which are sometimes referred to collectively as the
Punjabi Taliban, have played a very useful role for the Pakistan military as
‘jihadi proxies’ in Afghanistan and India since the 1980s (see Haqqani 2005:
287309). However, increasingly, these Punjab-based groups, many of which
have alleged Al Qaeda links, have turned their attention away from the
Kashmir issue and focused on spreading terror in the Punjab and elsewhere in
the country (ICG 2009: 3).
Whilst all these different groups often have their own local agenda they wish
to advance, there are common ‘principles’ which bind these militant groups
together. These include a deeply held anti-Western and anti-US outlook; a belief
that the Pakistan state is not legitimate; a jihadist drive to implement the sharia
throughout Pakistan; and a conviction that anyone who does not adhere to the
same ideology*for example, Shiites, Ahmadiyahs, Sufi followers and
Christians*is a legitimate target for their terrorist acts (see Synnott 2010: 86).
Under intense pressure from the Bush administration, President Musharraf sent
about 100,000 men into the FATA to flush out the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda
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fighters. While the Pakistan army was willing to go after the non-Pakhtun Al
Qaeda fighters, it was less keen to go after the Afghan Taliban. There were*and
still are*two reasons for this. The Afghan Taliban had forged links with the local
Pakistani militants, and some of these, as discussed above, have not been hostile
to the Pakistan state. Moreover, the military*in particular, the Inter-Services
Intelligence, which had developed close links with the Taliban since the early
1990s when it created it with the help of the Islamic parties*did not wish to
destroy a potential ally after the eventual departure of the coalition forces from
Afghanistan (see Waldman 2010). The Pakistan army has concluded that it is in
the country’s long-term interests not to attack some of these ‘friendly’ Afghan
Taliban forces. But, as noted above, loyalties change over time. So this may well
be a decision that Islamabad will come to regret in the future.
However, even in its selectiveness as to who it engages militarily, the Pakistan
army has suffered a very high number of military casualties and fatalities*some
3500 men, which is more than all the coalition force’s fatalities in Afghanistan.
After several failed, but costly, half-hearted attempts to deal with the Afghan
Taliban sanctuaries, the Musharraf government decided to try a different
approach. Accordingly, it signed peace agreements with local leaders in South
Waziristan (in April 2004 and February 2005) and North Waziristan (in
September 2006), meant to expel the foreign militants. Not surprisingly, these
accords quickly collapsed because it was assumed that the maliks controlled the
areas, when, in fact, the Pakistani Taliban did, and still does in North
Waziristan.
Under persistent pressure from the US administrations, the Pakistan govern-
ment decided to finally deal forcefully with the Pakistani militants. In the second
half of 2009, the army went into South Waziristan and Orakzai, where many of
the militants had fled following the Swat Valley operation earlier in the year.
Unfortunately, the army, which is not trained for counter-insurgency operations,
used heavy-handed methods which killed many innocent civilians. For example,
the Swat Valley operation forced some 2.5 million people to seek shelter
elsewhere and normalcy has yet to return completely to the valley. This
inappropriate military approach has provided*and continues to provide*the
Pakistani Taliban militants with political ammunition. So, while the army did
score some tactical victories and eliminated many militants, most of the TTP
fighters fled to North Waziristan where many Afghan Taliban groups are based.
However, because of the difficulty of the terrain, and not wishing to renege on the
unofficial agreements with some of the North Waziristan-based ‘friendly’
Pakistani Taliban militants, the army has been extremely reluctant to go into
that tribal agency to hunt down the Afghan Taliban*particularly the fighters of
the Haqqani Network, the most ruthless of all the Afghan groups. And despite
repeated assurances by General Kayani that the army will mount an operation, it
is unlikely that the armed forces are about to move into North Waziristan soon.
Because of Pakistan’s reluctance to go into North Waziristan, the Obama
administration has stepped up its use of unmanned drone attacks against the
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insurgents’ safe havens. Of the 279 attacks that have been executed since 2004,
269 have been conducted under President Obama*i.e. 96 percent of all attacks
(Roggio and Mayer 2011). And while there is a tacit understanding between the
United States and Pakistan governments about the execution of these drone
attacks, these air strikes have fuelled an already very strong anti-US mood in
Pakistan.11 Moreover, because these drones take off from Pakistan, these
attacks, especially when they cause civilian casualties, reinforce the public
perception that the Pakistan government is fighting the United States’ war at the
expense of the Pakistan people. This further weakens a president whose standing
in the polls is already very low. Nevertheless, these attacks have been highly
successful in eliminating about 100 Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban leaders, as
well as hundreds of middle-ranking fighters. And, of course, Pakistan has also
gained from these drone strikes, with high-value TTP leaders having been
eliminated.
Consequences of the twin challenges
In 2009, President Zardari admitted that the Pakistani Taliban had ‘a presence in
huge amounts of land’, forcing the country to fight a war against the hard-line
Islamists (see Parsons 2009). Figures as to how many people have been killed as a
result of terrorist acts are far from precise, but the estimates are that there have
been over 30,000 fatalities since 2001 (see South Asia Terrorism Potal 2011).
These are huge numbers for a country where suicide bombings were unknown
less than 10 years ago. However, while the country is not about to fall apart, the
combined economic development and security issues mutually reinforce the
serious challenges faced by the government of Pakistan which threaten
the country’s political future. The linkage between these two issues is intimate
and mutually reinforcing, for if the country continues to weaken economically,
the militants will exploit this economic fragility by targeting the more vulnerable
of society, coercively or with inducements, and, in turn, a growing militancy
problem will discourage domestic and foreign investment in the economy, thus
further weakening the economic base of Pakistan. It is a vicious circle which has
been made even more acute with the devastating floods of JulySeptember 2010.
It reinforces the point that what is happening internally in Pakistan can no longer
be ignored or isolated from developments in neighbouring Afghanistan and
beyond. Put differently, Pakistan’s problems are not solely its own; they are now
fast becoming issues for the international community.
President Obama acknowledged as much when he stated early in his
administration that Pakistan was ‘endangered as much as we are’ (Dawn.com
2009a). Accordingly, the Obama administration supported wholeheartedly the
Kerry-Lugar Act of 2009, which provides for US$7.5 billion in economic
assistance over five years. Moreover, at the USPakistan Strategic Dialogue
meeting held in Washington, DC in October 2010, the US administration
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announced a five-year US$2 billion aid package which would assist Pakistan to
buy arms, ammunition and other defence materiel from 2012 to 2016. And on 24
December 2010, Washington transferred more than US$600 million to the
Pakistan government to pay for its efforts in the fight against violent extremists.
These substantial financial commitments confirm that the United States is serious
about helping Pakistan deal with its militancy problem, as well as assisting the
country to improve its education, energy, housing, water and health-care
sectors*areas which need special attention if the country is to be able to
improve the economic lot of its 170 million people. While this will certainly help
combat extremism, it will also demonstrate to the people of Pakistan that the
United States cares about the future of Pakistan, even if it may only be for
self-interest. Still, it will go some way to compensate for what Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton refers to as the ‘trust deficit’ between the two countries
accumulated over many years of disappointment in the bilateral relationship
(see CNN.com 2010). But this will be a long-term project: fixing those two
interrelated challenges will not be done overnight, especially in the wake of the
devastating floods which set the country back several years economically.
Other members of the international community will also need to be involved.
The Friends of Democratic Pakistan, a grouping of some 20 countries created in
2008 to assist Pakistan with its socio-economic development and the consolida-
tion of its democratic credentials, has been an ideal forum to discuss how best to
help the country move forward. And while countries have pledged large sums of
money, they were not overwhelmingly generous either. Of the US$2 billion
pledge that the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon asked for*the largest ever
pledge call for a single emergency*only about half the target was met.12 The
main reason for the lack of generosity was that it was felt that unless Pakistan
took genuine steps to reform its system of governance, especially its dysfunc-
tional tax system, it was difficult to ask other countries to contribute funds.
The 2010 floods have, ironically, given a unique opportunity for the leaders of
Pakistan, with the help of the international community, to try to turn things
around and to improve the socio-economic conditions of the majority of the
people of Pakistan. There are a number of steps which need to be quickly taken in
order to stop the country’s economic decline from spiralling out of control. First,
Pakistan must broaden its tax base. This must include a thorough reform of the
personal tax system. As it stands today, only 1 percent of the population pays
taxes, with many of the country’s elite paying no taxes at all. The sales tax system
also needs to be reformed. And whilst the government has been trying to pass
legislation to revise the general sales tax, the opposition, led by former prime
minister Nawaz Sharif, has been blocking its passage. Second, the government
must rein in spending. Pakistan’s budget deficit now stands at 6 percent of GDP
and could rise to 8 percent. As a result, the government has had to borrow heavily
from the central bank, further fuelling inflation*an additional burden for
millions of people who can already barely survive. The government has little
choice about having to take some tough fiscal decisions because the International
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Monetary Fund has recently reaffirmed to Pakistan that unless it reforms its
general sales tax, it will not receive US$1.69 billion, the fifth review of a 23-
month standby arrangement. The stark reality is that Pakistan needs between 8
and 10 percent annual growth just to absorb the increase in the labour force and
reduce poverty. Present estimates are that Pakistan will only grow by about 3.5
percent in the fiscal year through June 2012 (see IMF 2011).
In the longer term, the government will need to commit much more of its
national budget to the development of the country’s social infrastructure,
especially in education and health. This will require deep cuts to the present
disproportionate expenditure on defence.13 However, this will only be
politically possible once there is significant improvement in Indo-Pakistan
relations, particularly with regard to Kashmir. Unfortunately, given the present
state of bilateral relations, this is not likely to happen soon.
Turning specifically to the FATA, the government of Pakistan will need to use
a combination of well-targeted military strikes against Pakistani Taliban
targets; implement political and socio-economic programs to bring the tribal
areas into mainstream Pakistan political and economic life; and enter into
negotiations with Pakistani militants willing to put down their arms. But
critically important is the need for the government to abandon its short-sighted
policy of supporting ‘good’ Pakistani militants, as this can only backfire in the
long term. In consultation with the people of the tribal areas, the government in
Islamabad needs to take steps to fully politically integrate the FATA into the
neighbouring province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.14
Importantly, there are three crucial factors that work in the Pakistan
government’s favour in dealing with the militants. First, the people of Pakistan,
including in the FATA, overwhelmingly reject the Pakistani Taliban’s religious
outlook and their drive to impose the sharia throughout the country. There have
been several surveys done in the last couple of years and each one of these
confirms the people’s opposition to the Taliban (see New America Foundation
2010; Shapiro and Fair 2010; Wasim 2010).15 Second, the Pakistani Taliban
movement is divided along many different fault lines*tribal, operational,
ideological, ethnic and links with the Pakistani authorities. And, third, there is
no single leader who can claim to speak for all of the militant groups. The
Pakistan government must take advantage of these weaknesses so that it can
regain the upper hand and set the political agenda.
Unfortunately, it is far from certain that the political leaders of Pakistan
have the political will to deal with the twin challenges facing their nation.
There was a very high level of misplaced expectation when the Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP) government was elected in 2007 that the new government
would fix all the country’s problems. Complicating matters has been the
fragility of the ruling coalition (the PPP, JUI and Muttahida Qaumi Move-
ment), which has been confirmed with its near collapse on several occasions
in 2010.
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Keeping a close watch on political developments in Islamabad is the army.
And whilst a coup is not likely at present, it does remain a possibility, especially
if the domestic political and security situation deteriorates further. General
Kayani would be unlikely to lead such a military takeover, but he could,
conceivably, be displaced by corps commanders who believe that it would be in
the best interest of the country to once again take over the reins of power. And,
as Nawaz (2008: 572) indicated, the new batch of military leaders will be
coming from the ‘Zia recruits’, the officers who were commissioned while
General Zia was actively promoting a conservative version of Islam. If such a
general were to take over, the army’s willingness to deal forcefully with the
militancy could well be compromised.
The long-term ramifications of a nuclear-armed Pakistan losing more and
more ground to the militants is a scenario too frightful to even contemplate*
one that would have repercussions far beyond its borders. The challenge for the
international community will be to ensure this does not happen, and the sooner
it assists Pakistan to deal with its long-term socio-economic and security
problems, the better it will be for the people of Pakistan. The 2010 floods may
well be the opportunity for everyone to rise to these challenges.
Notes
1. The author wishes to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive criticism of the
draft version of this article.
2. See the World Bank data profile, Bhttp://data.worldbank.org/country.
3. For a good economic analysis of the consequences of the floods, see Rodriguez (2010).
4. According to the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, the floods caused US$9.5
billion in damage (The Economist 2010).
5. For more details on these and the other targets, see the United Nations Development
Programme’s MDG Monitor, Bhttp://data.worldbank.org/country/pakistan.html.
6. FATA’s tribal areas is made up of seven agencies: Bajaur, Khyber Agency, Kurram Agency,
Mohmand Agency, Orakzai, South Waziristan and North Waziristan. The term ‘settled’
areas is used to refer to the areas outside the FATA*i.e. in the neighbouring province of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, previously known as the North-West Frontier Province.
7. These fundamental rights include the equality of citizens before the law; the equal protection
of the law; freedom of speech and expression; the right to association; the right to assemble
peacefully; and the right to form or be a member of a political party.
8. Because of the clandestine nature of these groups, much of the information about these
militants is sketchy and not fully reliable (see IRINHumanitarian News and Analysis 2010).
9. For a comprehensive analysis of the numerous extremist religious groups in Pakistan, see
Rana (2007). I will not discuss the various Afghan militant groups which have found refuge
in the FATA because it is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice to mention that these
Afghan groups have ‘professional’ relationships with the Pakistani militants and the Pakistani
authorities, particularly Inter-Services Intelligence (see Rashid 2008: 24061; Steinberg et al.
2010).
10. This reluctance to publicly oppose the militants’ coercive methods was echoed in an interview
I held with an influential leader of an Islamic party in Islamabad in March 2009.
Pakistan’s twin interrelated challenges 151
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 2
2:3
6 2
5 M
arc
h 2
01
2 
11. According to a survey conducted by the New America Foundation in JuneJuly 2010 with
1000 residents of the FATA, more than three-quarters of the FATA residents oppose US
drone attacks (Bergen and Doherty 2010).
12. According to the Financial Tracking Service, only 56 percent of the target had been met as of
14 January 2011. See Bhttp://fts.unocha.org/.
13. Expenditure on defence in the 20101 federal budget is 22 percent of the total. Education
and health, together, receive 2 percent (Government of Pakistan, 2010).
14. This was a sentiment stressed during an interview I held with a prominent member of the
Provincial Assembly of the then North-West Frontier Province in Islamabad in March 2009.
15. According to the New America Foundation survey (see note 11), over two-thirds of FATA
residents oppose the presence of the Pakistani Taliban. In another survey conducted by the
Pew Research Center in Washington, DC in June 2010, only 10 percent of Pakistanis liked
the Taliban, Bwww.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspa-
per/front-page/most-pakistanis-are-pacifist%2c-says-survey-960. As noted above, Shapiro
and Fair’s (2010) survey was an important contribution to the debate about the extent of
popular support for the militants. However, it is important to note that the survey was taken
among urban respondents in September 2007, over four years ago. This was before several
important developments: the dramatic increase in US drone strikes in the FATA; the
assassination of Benazir Bhutto; the significant increase in militancy in the FATA and
elsewhere in the country; and the military operations in the Swat Valley, South Waziristan
and Orakzai.
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